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Abstract
This paper investigates the allocative properties of an OLG speciﬁc-
factors small open economy facing perfect capital mobility. Wealth for-
mation, economic development and diﬀerent labor market regimes are
at the center-stage of the analysis. In a model with competitive wages
and no unemployment, we ﬁnd that exogenous shocks that do not af-
fect human wealth —like the terms of trade and land endowment shifts—
or the propensity to save, leave nonhuman wealth, consumption and
aggregate labor unchanged; in such cases, capital formation is driven
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1by the static eﬀects exerted on sectoral labor. Disturbances that al-
ter human wealth —like the world interest rate, and capital and labor
taxation shocks— or the thrift rate, instead, aﬀect nonhuman wealth
and consumption as they involve an intergenerational redistribution of
resources that modiﬁes aggregate saving; labor hours supplied may be
changed. In these circumstances, capital accumulation is the result of
the consequences exerted on ﬁnancial wealth and input demands. The
consideration of a labor market with structural unemployment does
not qualitatively aﬀect the results, except for the world interest rate
and the rate of time discount shifts. Our results diﬀer substantially
from those obtained in static and dynamic speciﬁc-factors setups with
ﬁnancial autharky.
JEL classiﬁcation: F41, F43, O41.
Keywords: Speciﬁc-Factors; Capital Accumulation; Land; Net For-
eign Assets; Finite Horizons.
21 Introduction
The speciﬁc-factors model of international trade, developed by Jones (1971)
and Samuelson (1971), represents, once formulated in a dynamic version, the
natural apparatus for investigating the distinct role that reproducible and
non-reproducible productive assets play in the intertemporal allocation of
resources. In fact, physical capital and unimproved land —the usual speciﬁc-
factors considered— represent alternative vehicles for holding wealth. More-
over, speciﬁc-factor supplies and values are strictly linked to wealth accu-
mulation; in particular, saving decisions make the supply of physical capital
endogenous, but only aﬀect the land market value, as the supply of land is
ﬁxed.1
The analysis of a speciﬁc-factors economy in an intertemporal context was
ﬁrst carried out by Eaton (1987), who considers factor-asset speciﬁcity in a
two-sector life-cycle model of capital formation with ﬁnancial autharky. In
such a dynamic setting, the predictions of the simple Jones-Samuelson model
in terms of relative commodity prices and factor endowments are enriched and
sometimes modiﬁed. This is because the consideration of capital and land
as stores of value introduces an asset-valuation eﬀect into the model due to
the change in the land value induced by exogenous shifts, which aﬀects the
amount of saving left over for capital formation. For example, an increase in
1The simultaneous role of land as a ﬁxed factor of production and an asset was initially
considered within a dynamic optimizing model by Feldstein (1977), who analyzed the
incidence of a tax on pure rent. The original idea of the interaction between the land
value and capital accumulation, however, dates back to Ricardo (1817).
3the relative price of the land-using commodity has ambiguous implications
on factor rents, the value of land, and the capital stock. These ambiguities
depend on the contrasting consequences exerted by the asset-valuation eﬀect,
on the one hand, and the Jones-Samuelson static eﬀect, on the other, on the
labor market, factor prices, and the value of land. When the labor share and
the elasticity of substitution in the land-using industry are small, the asset-
valuation eﬀect dominates, implying that the terms of trade shock leads to
a rise in the interest rate and a reduction in the wage rate and investment
in ﬁxed capital; the opposite is true, when the labor share and elasticity of
substitution are large.
Financial capital immobility is, however, at odds with the reality for many
advanced economies that have an unrestricted access to the world ﬁnancial
market and are exposed to the repeated waves of ﬁnancial globalization, as
agents also hold foreign assets (in addition to the domestic ones) in their
portfolios.
Some recent articles have developed intertemporal optimizing speciﬁc-
factors models in a perfectly integrated ﬁnancial world. See, for example,
Roldos (1991), Brock and Turnovsky (1993), and Kose (2002). These studies,
addressing diﬀerent issues —like the growth eﬀects of tariﬀsa n dt h ei n t e r n a -
tional generation-propagation of the business cycle— within representative-
agent small open economies, do not consider land as an asset, but simply as
a ﬁxed factor of production.2 Therefore, they do not consider the transmis-
sion mechanism of exogenous impulses on the market value of the ﬁxed asset
2In the literature, sector-speciﬁc capital models have also been developed; see, for exam-
ple, Ryder (1969) and, when capital adjustment costs are high, Morshed and Turnovsky
(2004). These models incorporate the assumption that capital is completely immobile
across sectors, being speciﬁc to the sector in which it is located.
4and hence their feedbacks on saving funneled into capital formation and net
foreign asset holdings.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocative properties of an
OLG speciﬁc-factors two-sector economy, facing perfect capital mobility and
using labor endogenously, in which land is a productive asset.3 The analysis
focuses on wealth formation and economic development within an articulated
portfolio structure, characterized by two productive assets —one reproducible
and one non-reproducible— and one non-productive asset. Furthermore, two
alternative labor market structures are considered: one with competitive
wages and no unemployment, one with incentive-wages and structural unem-
ployment.
We study the quasi-opposite case of the Jones-Samuelson static one —
where the capital stock is inelastically supplied and the price of capital is
ﬂexible— as in our analysis capital formation is endogenous and the price of
capital is ﬁxed at a world level because of perfect capital mobility.4
One of the key-ﬁndings of the analysis is that exogenous shocks that do
not aﬀect human wealth —like the terms of trade and land endowment shifts—
or the saving rate, leave consumption, nonhuman wealth and aggregate labor
unchanged. In these cases, capital formation is driven by the static eﬀects
3As p e c i ﬁc-factors model of capital accumulation in a ﬁnancially globalized economy
with an inelastic labor supply has been developed by Eaton (1988). In this paper, Eaton
only investigates the eﬀects of parametric changes in foreign assets, in an economy that
is ﬁnancially semi-integrated at a world level, and the relative commodity prices, in an
economy with perfect capital mobility.
4The hypothesis of unrestricted access to the world capital market exerts strong im-
plications on income distribution of a speciﬁc-factors setup. The income distribution of
a speciﬁc-factors model is also heavily aﬀected in economies with inﬁnite horizons; see,
for example, Roldos (1992), where an immortal monetary economy with ﬁnancial capital
immobility is studied.
5that the exogenous disturbances exert on labor used in the capital-using
sector.
Disturbances that alter human wealth —like exogenous shifts regarding
the world interest rate, as well as capital and labor taxation— or the thrift
rate, instead, aﬀect ﬁnancial wealth and consumption as they involve a re-
distribution of resources across diﬀerent generations that modiﬁes individual
and aggregate savings. In such cases, while wealth formation is driven by
intergenerational forces operating through human wealth, capital formation
is the result of changes in ﬁnancial wealth, the ﬁrm’s cost of capital and the
production structure. The land-valuation eﬀect along with capital formation
determines the consequence of the exogenous shocks on the holdings of net
foreign assets. Aggregate labor supplied is only responsive to disturbances
that aﬀect the world interest rate and the rate of time preference.
Finally, we show that the consideration of a labor market with structural
unemployment, due to incentive-wages of the shirking type, may qualitatively
aﬀect the results obtained with competitive wages and no unemployment only
in the case that the interest rate or propensity to save shifts.5
Our results diﬀer substantially from those obtained in the static and
dynamic speciﬁc-factors analyses with capital and land; see Jones (1971),
Samuelson (1971), and Eaton (1987 and 1988).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the neoclassical
model and investigates its allocative characteristics as well as the steady state
eﬀects of several shifts. Section 3 studies the properties of an incentive-wage
economy. Section 4 concludes.
5Structural unemployment was introduced into a speciﬁc-factors economy also by Kee
and Hoon (2005) through the consideration of unions’ wage setting with the aim of studying
the factors responsible for the secular decline of Singapore’s unemployment.
62 Neoclassical economy
2.1 The model
Consider a real small open economy that produces two goods, X and Y ,
a n do p e r a t e si naw o r l do fp e r f e c tﬁnancial capital mobility. The two sectors
of production, which present a Jones-Samuelson physiognomy, are competi-
tive and use standard neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production func-
tions.6 Good X, assumed to be the numeraire, is obtained by using physical
capital K, which is sector-speciﬁc, and labor LX, which is perfectly mobile
across sectors, namely X = F(K,LX)=LXf(
K
LX
),w h e r ef()is the sectoral
output-labor ratio, f  > 0,a n df   < 0. Good Y , whose price measured in
terms of the numeraire is
∼
p ﬁxed at world level, is produced by employing
unimproved land T and sectoral labor LY, i.e. Y = H(T,LY).





















p HL(T,LY)=v(1 + τL), (1d)
where r∗ is the given world interest rate (equal to the domestic interest rate
because of perfect capital mobility), τK the ad valorem tax rate on capital,
v the hourly real wage, τL the ad valorem tax rate on labor, and R the land
6See Jones (1971), Samuelson (1971) and Mussa (1974).
7reward. Full wage ﬂexibility and perfect sectoral mobility of labor ensure
that both sectors face identical wages. We assume that only capital and
labor are taxed, while land is untaxed.7
On the demographic-side, we postulate that this economy is peopled by
Blanchard-Yaari households having uncertain lifetimes, leaving no bequest,
facing a constant mortality rate θ, and supplying labor endogenously; see
Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985).8 The population, composed of chrono-
logically disconnected cohorts continuously entering the economy, is assumed
to remain constant and hence is normalized to one.





l represents the time endowment and l labor hours










exp[−(θ + ρ)(j − t)]dj,









∗ + θ)(j − t)] = 0,
7This is because taxing land rent is basically inessential for the macroeconomic equi-
librium in the case of the accommodation regime for the government budget considered
here; see footnote 19 below for some considerations on the eﬀects of a tax on land.
8Kanaginis and Phelps (1994), and Phelps (1994, ch. 16) develop the Blanchard-Yaari
setup in the case of elastic labor-leisure choices. On the consumer-side, we depart from
Eaton (1987) and (1988), where, instead, the two-period Diamond-Samuelson demograph-
ics are employed, and labor is inelastically supplied.
8where w(s,t) denotes nonhuman wealth of a consumer born at time s, ρ the
rate of time preference (exogenous), and α a positive preference parameter.
















∗ + θ)(j − t)]dj.
The demand-side of the model can be expressed in aggregate terms as
.
C=( r












∗W + vL, (2d)
where time indices have been omitted and capital letters denote aggregate
variables of the corresponding individual ones. Equation (2a) describes the
Blanchard-Yaari law for consumption dynamics,9 (2b) the supply of labor,
9Note that equation (2a) is obtained by using the aggregate life-cycle consumption
function, i.e. C = α(θ + ρ)(W + H), together with (2c) and (2d).
9(2c) the human wealth dynamics, and (2d) the aggregate consumer budget
constraint.
Nonhuman wealth is composed of physical capital K,u n i m p r o v e dl a n dT
and net foreign assets B;t h a ti s ,W = K + qT + B,w h e r eq is the price of
land (expressed in terms of the capital-using good).10 The stock of nonhuman
wealth is assumed to be strictly positive; hence, the steady state equilibrium
requires from (2a) that r∗ > ρ.
As assets are considered to be perfectly substitutable, their rates of return










where perfect foresight has been assumed.
The economy is endowed with a ﬁxed quantity of non-reproducible land
∼
T, fully used in the Y -sector. The labor market equilibrium requires that
t h ea m o u n to fl a b o re m p l o y e db yﬁrms in the two sectors of production must
equal aggregate labor supplied by households; that is,
LX + LY = L. (4)
The government collects revenues by taxing capital and labor, and spends
them unproductively for acquiring goods and services. Therefore, the gov-
ernment budget constraint is given by
τKr
∗K + τLvL = G, (5)
10We are assuming that capital and land are entirely owned by domestic residents, who
are free to borrow and lend abroad. It could be alternatively assumed, without altering
the equilibrium, that the stock of capital and land are partly owned by domestic residents
and partly by foreigners (see, for example, Eaton, 1988).
10where G represents unproductive government spending. We assume that the
government budget is kept continuously balanced through the endogenous
adjustment of G.11
Finally, the current account, i.e. the trade balance plus the interest in-




p Y − C−
.
K −G + r
∗B. (6)
2.2 Comparative statics
The analysis focuses on the long-run properties of our OLG speciﬁc-factors
economy.12 It is worth emphasizing some mechanical features of the steady
state in order to facilitate the understanding of the comparative static analy-
sis. First, the marginal productivity of capital is tied down by the given cost
of capital for ﬁrms, r∗(1 + τK). This implies that (1a) uniquely determines




∗(1 + τK)], κ
  < 0, (7a)
where overbar variables denote steady state values and κ(·)=f −1(·).
Equation (7a) establishes, for a given r∗(1 + τK), a positive relationship
11We deliberately avoid considering lump-sum tax ﬁnancing as changes in lump-sum
taxes would cause a redistribution of income across generations, modifying aggregate sav-
ing and the stock of nonhuman wealth, and hence obscuring the implications of the ex-
ogenous shocks on the resource allocation. Notice that the case of a compensatory ﬁnance
based on consumption taxation would leave our ﬁndings unchanged.
12The complete macroeconomic model —obtained by combining the optimality conditions
for ﬁrms and households with the market clearing conditions, the government budget
constraint, and the relevant equations of accumulation— is saddle-point stable as shown in
an unpublished Appendix.
11between the capital stock and labor employed in the capital-using sector. An
increase in the cost of capital for ﬁrms, due to either higher r∗ or τK,l o w e r s
the capital intensity as it reduces the demand for capital.





  < 0, (7b)
where ω(·)=f[κ(·)]−κ(·)f [κ(·)]. A rise in either the world interest rate
or the capital tax rate, by shrinking the capital intensity, drives the real wage
down. A higher labor taxation leaves the ﬁrm’s labor cost unchanged, but
lowers the household take-home wage.











∗(1 + τK)], Λ∼
p > 0, Λ∼
T > 0, Λr∗(1+τK) > 0.13 (7c)
A rise in the terms of trade (or in the land endowment) stimulates labor
demand in the land-using sector and hence increases LY. A higher cost of
c a p i t a l ,b yr e d u c i n gt h ew a g er a t et h r o u g ht h ef a l li n K
LX
, induces ﬁrms to
hire more labor in the Y -sector.
Deﬁne y
W
as the income from nonhuman wealth, given by the sum of the
interest income on wealth and the actuarial premium on wealth received by
households from competitive insurance companies; that is, y
W
=( r∗+θ) W.14
Taking into account such a deﬁnition together with relationships (7), the















14The introduction of the auxiliary variable y
W
is done with the aim of facilitating the
comparison of the neoclassical economy with the incentive-wage one.




























+ vL . (8d)
LX is determined from (7a), once (8a) is used to substitute out the capital
stock.
In order to understand how aggregate labor hours are determined, we
proceed as in Petrucci and Phelps (2005). Substituting C from (8d) into













Equation (9) gives the labor supply in terms of the nonwage-income-to-






lowers manhours worked because it raises,
through (8d), the consumption-to-wage ratio and hence, through (8b), the
demand for leisure. Equation (9) is represented by the LS schedule in Fig.
1. The LS schedule becomes steeper if a rise in r∗ takes place.











, Θr∗ < 0, Θρ > 0, (10)
13where Θ(r∗,ρ)=
[αθ(θ + ρ) − r∗(r∗ − ρ)]
(r∗ − ρ)(r∗ + θ)
> 0.15 Equation (10) describes









compatible with the Blanchard-Yaari asset
market equilibrium as described by the arbitrage condition between con-
sumption and nonhuman wealth returns. This relationship is represented by
the upward-sloping BY schedule in Fig. 1. Intuitively, an increase in the
ratio of income-from-wealth-to-wage pulls up the consumption-to-wage ratio







a compensatory rise in manhours is needed in order to satisfy the consumer
budget constraint (8d). The BY curve is rotated in a clockwise direction by
either a rise in r∗ or a fall in ρ.
The intersection between the LS and BY schedules determines aggregate
labor hours worked and the nonwage-income-to-wage ratio. Since the exoge-
nous shifts that impinge on (9) and (10) only regard r∗ and ρ,m a n h o u r s
and the income-from-wealth-to-wage ratio remain invariant when any other
exogenous disturbance occurs.
[Insert Fig. 1 about here]







ﬁed, the eﬀects on y
W
and C can be inferred by using (7b), (8c), and (8d).
K, instead, is derived from (8a).
15The condition αθ(θ+ρ) >r ∗(r∗−ρ) guarantees the saddle-point stability of the steady
state.





∗(1 + τK)],R ∼








∗(1 + τK)],q ∼
p > 0,q r∗ ≶ 0,q τK > 0. (11b)












We can now study the long-run eﬀects of several exogenous shifts. Table
1 provides a synoptical view of the various comparative static results.
2.2.1 The terms of trade
Consider the eﬀects of a rise in the relative price of the land-using good
∼
p.17







unchanged. Therefore, nonhuman wealth and consumption are invariant, as
the household wage is constant from (7b). As the increase in
∼
p expands LY
from (7c), a reduction of labor used in the capital-using sector occurs so as
16Equations (11) are obtained by using (1c), (3) and (7). The eﬀects of exogenous shifts
on the land reward and the land market value are given by:
R∼




















r∗(1 + τK) LY − R
∼
T} ≶ 0, qτK =
RτK
r∗ > 0 .
17A terms of trade shock can be assimilated qualitatively to a technological shock that
aﬀects the land-using sector.
15to leave aggregate labor hours constant. The contraction of LX brings about
a fall in the capital stock.
Non-land input prices are constant, while the land reward is driven up
since land and labor are Edgeworth complementary. Thus, the market value
of land is increased. The stock of foreign assets may either rise or fall, since
the capital stock diminishes and the land value is pulled up.18
2.2.2 Land endowment
Ar i s ei n
∼
T reproduces qualitatively most of the macroeconomic eﬀects of an
increase in
∼
p; such a shock, however, does not aﬀect the marginal productivity
of land and the land market value.19
2.2.3 Capital shift
Since the experiment of a pure parametric change in the reproducible speciﬁc-
factor cannot be performed, as capital is endogenously accumulated, we al-
ternatively study the eﬀect of a capital-promoting shock, like the reduction
in the capital tax rate.20

















19Note that if land rent taxation were considered (under the government spending ﬁnanc-
ing rule adopted here), a rise in the land tax would be neutral for the resource allocation
and the incidence analysis; the sole eﬀects of the land tax would be a fall in the land
value and a compensatory rise in the stock of net foreign assets. The same eﬀects are
obtained by Eaton (1988) and Petrucci (2005) in one-sector economies operating under
perfect capital mobility.
20This shock is qualitatively equivalent to a technological change that aﬀects the pro-
duction of the capital-using sector.
16Af a l li nτK, accompanied by a compensatory accommodation of gov-
ernment spending, does not change both labor hours and the income-from-
wealth-to-wage ratio. The reduction in the capital tax rate raises the capital
intensity and hence the wage rate —through (7a) and (7b), respectively— as
the cost of capital for ﬁrms falls. The higher household wage rate pulls non-
human wealth up alongside consumption. Labor in the land-using sector is
reduced because of the higher wage rate, while labor used for producing X
rises. The increase in the capital intensity implies that the capital stock ex-
pands proportionally more than LX. The land yield and the land price fall.
Net foreign assets may go up or down.
The consequences of τK on income from wealth and consumption have
an intergenerational motivation stemming from the induced change in hu-
man wealth. In fact, the decline in τK brings about an increase in human
wealth (because of the higher household wage),21 which redistributes income
from the older generations, who consume more and save less, to the younger
generations, who consume less and save more. This mechanism increases
aggregate saving and, in turn, expands the stock of nonhuman wealth and
consumption.
2.2.4 Labor shift
As the supply of labor is endogenous, we consider a labor taxation shift as
the exogenous shock that aﬀects the mobile factor.22 A reduction in the labor
21From (2c) and (7b), long-run human wealth can be expressed as H=
ω[r∗(1 + τK)] L
(1 + τL)(r∗ + θ)
.
22Another possible labor shift that could be considered is the parametric change in the
aggregate time endowment. An increase in
∼
L can be associated with a more eﬃcient use
of time, due, for example, to a reduction of the commuting-time in traﬃc congested areas
(this can be ascribed to succesful transport and anti-traﬃc policies) or technical changes






. The cost of labor for ﬁrms is
unchanged; this implies that the workers’ take-home wage is pulled up being
the labor tax rate lower. Nonhuman wealth and consumption are therefore
increased. Since L and LY are invariant, labor used in the capital-using sector
and hence the capital stock also remain unchanged. The price of capital, the
land reward and the price of land are unaltered by the τL shock as well. A
rise in net foreign assets occurs.
2.2.5 Saving shift
In order to fully understand how this speciﬁc-factor economy works, we study
the consequences of a saving-stimulative shock.23 Our experiment considers
an increase in thrift, i.e. a reduction in the rate of time preference.24
Af a l li nρ rotates the BY schedule in a clockwise direction; see Fig. 1.
The equilibrium moves from point A to point A’. Thus, a lower ρ reduces
aggregate labor and increases the income-from-nonhuman-wealth-to-wage ra-
(like the ICT revolution) that in some circumstances may make it possible to work at
home and de facto expand the available time for leisure and work. A higher
∼
L raises
manhours supplied and, given that the wage rate remains constant, nonhuman wealth.
Consumption also expands. Since labor used to produce Y is unchanged, the rise in
aggregate labor is entirely matched by an increase of labor employed in the capital-using
sector, which results in a higher capital stock. Input prices and the land value are not
touched by the disturbance, while the stock of net foreign assets is unclearly aﬀected.
23When ﬁnancial capital immobility is considered, as in Eaton (1987), this shock is
equivalent to a capital stock stimulus; in our context, instead, such a shock diﬀers from a
pure capital shift because domestic savers also hold net foreign assets in their portfolios.
24Note that a decrease in either the mortality rate θ, i.e. a longer consumer life-time
span, or a nonwage income or a nonhuman wealth tax would generate the same qualitative
consequences of a fall in ρ. The analysis of the eﬀects of a nonwage income tax in a one-
sector OLG small open economy is provided, for example, by Nielsen and Sørensen (1991).
18tio. This implies that y
W
increases as v is given. Consumption also rises, but
proportionally less than the cash-ﬂow from wealth. Labor in the capital-using
sector reﬂects the reduction in L,s i n c eLY is constant; consequently a fall
in K takes place.25 Factor prices and the land value do not move. The rise
in nonhuman wealth derives entirely from the accumulation of net foreign
assets, which represent the only way-out to support the higher saving.26
2.2.6 World interest rate
A world interest rate shift may be seen as a composite disturbance resulting
from the simultaneous change in τK, in the same direction, and ρ,i nt h e
opposite direction.
Ar i s ei nr∗, for example, rotates both the LS and BY schedules in a
clockwise direction; the BY schedule rotates horizontally to a greater ex-







capital intensity in the X-sector shrinks as capital is more expensive for
ﬁrms. The workers’ wage is reduced. Income from nonhuman wealth moves
ambiguously; also the eﬀect on consumption is unclear.27
Labor in the land-using sector is stimulated by the lower labor cost for
ﬁrms, while labor in the capital-using sector is reduced because of the re-
25If the labor supply were inelastic, i.e. α =1and L=
∼
L, the decline in ρ would always
be stimulative for nonhuman wealth and consumption, but inconsequential for capital
formation and the sectoral allocation of labor.
26Note that if a hike in consumption taxation (accompanied by a compensatory in-
crease in government spending) were implemented with the aim of stimulating saving, its
eﬀects would be neutral for the macroeconomic equilibrium, except for the level of physical
consumption, which would fall, leaving consumption expenditure constant.
27The lower the mortality rate θ, the more likely the negative multipliers for nonwage
income and consumption are.
19duced labor supply; K falls proportionally more than LX.T h e m a r g i n a l




The neoclassical model does not explain equilibrium unemployment as wages
adjust to equate the labor supply and demand, and changes in labor are
only due to variations of manhours. In order to investigate the implications
of the ’natural’ rate of unemployment for the macroeconomic equilibrium
of our speciﬁc-factors economy, we use the incentive-wage theory, based on
the assumption of the shirking behavior of workers, as developed by Calvo
(1979), Solow (1979), and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). We adapt the two-
sector Heckscher-Ohlin economy with structural unemployment, developed
by Phelps (1994, ch. 9), to our case.
The production function for good X is now given by X = F(K,εNX)=
εNXf(k), where F( , ) is linearly homogeneous, ε is a continuous variable
that represents the eﬃciency of a single worker in the ﬁrm, NX is the number
o fw o r k e r se m p l o y e di nt h eX-sector, f(k) is the output per unit of labor




capital-labor ratio, f  > 0, and f   < 0. The production of good Y uses the
constant-return-to-scale technology Y = H(T,εNY),w h e r eNY is the number
of employees in Y -sector. The workers’ eﬀo r ti st h es a m ei nt h et w o - s e c t o r s .






) —where εi <
0, εij < 0,f o r i,j =1 ,2— to describe the employee’s eﬀort; z is the expected
20income obtainable elsewhere if the worker is ﬁred, v the wage per employee
paid in the ﬁrm and yW t h ea v e r a g en o n w a g ei n c o m eo fw o r k e r s ,t a k e na sa
ratio to the worker population (whose size is unity).28
The ﬁrst-order conditions for maximum proﬁti nt h et w os e c t o r sa r e 29
f
 (k)=r
∗(1 + τK), (12a)
ε[f(k) − kf
 (k)] = ε
∼


























The workers’ expected income can be expressed as z = Nv if the popula-
tion and the labor force are normalized to one and there are no unemployment
subsidies (see Calvo, 1979, and Salop, 1979). Combining (12b) and (12c) and












According to (12c’), the sum of the partial elasticities of the eﬀort func-
tion, taken in absolute value, must be equal to one.
28Phelps (1994) demonstrates theoretically why the propensity to shirk can be consid-
ered homogeneous of degree zero in z, v and yW.
29The concavity of the production function and the assumed signs of the second deriva-
tives of the eﬀort function ensure that the second-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s optimality
problem are satisﬁed.





  < 0, (13)
where Γ  = −












< 0. Equation (13) repre-
sents the incentive-wage equation in implicit form. It implicitly gives the
optimal wage that ﬁrms wish to pay for any level of N and yW.E q u a t i o n
(13) is depicted in Fig. 2 as the IW schedule.
Employment in the two sectors equals total employment in the economy:
NX + NY = N. (14)
The rest of the model is the same as in the neoclassical economy, once L
is replaced by N.






, Θr∗ < 0, Θρ > 0.30 (15)
The rest of the long-run economy is described by
K= κ[r





  < 0, (16a)
v (1 + τL)= εω [r





∗(1 + τK)], ω
  < 0, (16c)














.31 T h es t o c ko fn e tc l a i m so nf o r e i g n e r si so b t a i n e d








In the long-run, employment and the income-from-wealth-to-wage ratio are




(and therefore ε)a r e
only aﬀected by changes in ρ and r∗.
Shocks to the terms of trade, land endowment and input tax rates are
inconsequential for aggregate employment, the income-from-weath-to-wage
ratio, and the eﬀort of employees. No qualitative changes are obtained in
the incentive-wage case, once L , LX and LY are respectively replaced by
N , NX and NY. Since the factor demand system that governs the eﬀects
of these shocks is basically the same as in the competitive-wage economy
(ε being unaltered). Hence, for these shocks, it is not worth repeating the
comparative static analysis developed before.
Disturbances that inﬂuence ρ and r∗ —although aﬀecting (13) and (15)
in a way that is qualitatively equivalent to the one seen in the neoclassical
economy—, instead, alter the workers’ eﬃciency and produce macroeconomic
eﬀects that are not immediate and may diﬀer from the case of competitive
wages.
31In the system (16), the expressions κ(·)=f −1(·),a n dω(·)=f[κ(·)]−κ(·)f [κ(·)]
have been used.
233.2.1 Saving shift
A reduction in ρ rotates the BY schedule downward in Fig. 2. The equilib-
rium moves from A to A’. The eﬀe c ti st or e d u c ea g g r e g a t ee m p l o y m e n ta n d
increase the income-from-wealth-to-wage ratio.
T h ee m p l o y e e ’ se ﬀort is pulled up by the deterioration of the labor market





. The net eﬀect on ε is therefore ambiguous. However, aggregate
employment expressed in eﬃciency units εN declines.32 Since ε NY is con-
stant from (16c), ε NX falls; also the capital stock is driven down, as the
capital intensity in eﬃciency units is tied down by the given cost of capital.
The unclear eﬀect on ε implies that the wage rate, income from wealth, con-
sumption, sectoral employment, and net foreign assets may rise or fall. The
land reward and the land value, instead, do not move.
Let us see what happens if ε rises.33 The workers’ wage, income from
nonhuman wealth, consumption and net foreign assets increase. y
W
increases
proportionally more than v. NY and NX are both reduced.
If instead ε declines, the wage per employee falls from (12b). The cash-
ﬂow from nonhuman wealth, consumption and the net claims on foreigners
may rise or decline. Employment in the Y -sector increases, while employment
in the capital-using sector contracts.
[Insert Fig. 2 about here]







33This case occurs when the eﬀect of the labor market prospects on the eﬀort function
is relatively stronger in magnitude than the eﬀect of the nonwage-income-to-wage ratio.
243.2.2 World interest rate




rises because the BY schedule rotates downward for an invariant IW
schedule. The employee’s eﬀort moves unclearly, but εN is decreased. The
capital intensity is diminished by the higher cost of capital.
Labor employed in the land-using sector expressed in eﬃciency units is
stimulated —see (16c)—, while employment in eﬃciency units in the capital-
using sector shrinks. The wage rate per employee most probably falls, while
income from wealth and consumption may rise or diminish. The marginal
productivity of land is pulled up, while the land market value as well as net
foreign assets are ambiguously aﬀected.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has investigated the steady state properties of a ﬁnancially glob-
alized speciﬁc-factors economy with two-sectors of production. Two features
are incorporated into the analysis: the chronological disconnection of hetero-
geneous generations, on the one hand, and the interaction between productive
assets (namely, physical capital and land) and unproductive ones (namely,
net claims of foreigners), on the other. An additional element of relevance
studied in the paper is the role of the labor market structure. Two types
of labor market have been considered: a neoclassical one, with ﬂexible wage
and no unemployment, and an incentive-wage one, with sticky real wage and
the ”natural rate” of unemployment.
The terms of trade, land endowment, factor taxation, the rate of subjec-
tive time discount and the world interest rate impact on the intertemporal
25allocation resources in diﬀerentiated non-obvious ways. Our ﬁndings depart
substantially from what is contemplated in the static speciﬁc-factors model
of Jones (1971) and Samuelson (1971), as well as the dynamic speciﬁc-factors
setup of a ﬁnancially-closed economy developed by Eaton (1987).
Shocks that leave human wealth or the saving rate unaﬀected exert no
intergenerational consequences on the economy, but only change factor em-
ployment according to the static input demand system. Disturbances that
impact on human wealth or the subjective rate of time preference, instead,
exert intergenerational eﬀects on the macroeconomic equilibrium by alter-
ing the distribution of income across generations with diﬀerent propensity to
save. Such a redistributive mechanism leads to a change in aggregate saving,
which in turn alters the stock of nonhuman wealth and consumption. The
implications for factor prices and employment originate from these aggregate
consequences.
Diﬀerently from the dynamic speciﬁc-factors model with ﬁnancial au-
tharky —where the price of land aﬀects the amount of saving devoted to capi-
tal formation— in a model with perfect capital mobility, the land-valuation ef-
fect has no direct implications on wealth accumulation and economic growth,
but only inﬂuences the net claims of foreigners.
Within an incentive-wage economy, the consequences of exogenous shifts
obtained under full wage ﬂexibility do not change, except for the subjective
discount rate and the world interest rate shocks; in these circumstances, the
induced eﬀect on the employee’s propensity to shirk may alter the results for
sectoral employment, the wage rate, nonhuman wealth, and consumption.
The analysis has shown that, in a two-sector small open economy with
asset-factor speciﬁc i t ya n da ni n t e r e s tr a t eﬁxed at world level, wealth and
capital formation obey diﬀerent rules of macroeconomic determination. In
26a neoclassical economy, long-run ﬁnancial wealth (which is proportional to
nonwage income) is determined by human wealth, i.e. the present discounted
value of the wage-bill (which is overall inﬂuenced by the capital and labor
tax rates, the world interest rate and the rate of time discount). Therefore,











The terms of trade and land endowment exert no eﬀects on nonhuman wealth.
The capital stock is, instead, determined by the capital intensity (aﬀected
by the capital tax rate and the world interest rate), aggregate labor hours
(altered by the rate of time preference and the interest rate) and labor in the
land-using sector (inﬂuenced in turn by the terms of trade, land endowment,
the capital tax rate and the world interest rate); hence, its long-run reduced-

















Labor taxation is neutral for the capital stock. Among the several exogenous
shocks investigated, only capital taxation has the same steady state eﬀects,
in qualitative terms, on nonhuman wealth and the capital stock.
Finally, aggregate labor hours or workers’ employment are only aﬀected
by those exogenous variables capable of changing the income-from-wealth-to-
wage ratio, like, for example, the saving rate and the world interest rate. We
discover that capital and labor tax rates do not aﬀect aggregate manhours
as they change income from wealth and the household wage by the same
proportion.34
34The long-run (but not short-run) neutrality of capital and labor taxation also holds
in a one-sector small open economy with ﬁnite lives (see Petrucci and Phelps, 2005).
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